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Abstract 
 
In this paper we investigate if the German implied volatility index, VDAX, could 
be used as a good sentiment indicator for a contrarian strategy. For such a 
strategy to be legitimate there must exist price inefficiencies in the market, which 
requires that the efficient market hypothesis does not hold. We compare broader 
index-based contrarian strategies with a buy and hold strategy in the German  
stock index DAX from 1992-2012. The results shows that the contrarian strategy 
performs better in bearish periods but that it does not outperform the buy and 
hold strategy in the overall sample period.  
 
Key words: DAX, VDAX, Implied volatility, Contrarian strategy, The efficient 
market hypothesis, Behavioral finance, Market timing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Acknowledgement 
 
We would like to thank our supervisor Bujar Huskaj for his valuable insights and 
fast response to queires. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“We simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy 
only when others are fearful.” 
 
–Warren Buffett 
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1. Introduction 
 The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been dominating the finance and 
economic curriculum in educational establishments all over the world for decades. 
With time, market crashes and stock price anomalies that could not be explained 
within the framework of this theory raised questions regarding the theory's 
validity. The arguments have mostly been focused toward the assumptions about 
agents being fully rational and prices reflecting all available information, which 
have lead to an increasing focus on the field of behavioral finance for 
explanations. 
 
 Behavioral finance assumes that market anomalies and investor biases do 
exist, i.e. that the prices in the market do not always reflect the true value of an 
asset, but the area more rarely describes what methods a rational investor could 
in fact use to exploit these anomalies. In recent years, strategies aiming to exploit 
market anomalies have provided interesting findings concerning serial correlation 
over various time horizons (see, for example, Campbell, Grossman & Wang, 
1993). These strategies imply that investors can achieve an excess return through 
active trading by exploiting assumed contrarian and momentum effects.1 
  
 Most of the research on contrarian and momentum type investment 
strategies have employed the procedure of taking positions in individual stocks 
(see, for example, Fama and French (1988), Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In short, a contrarian strategy is when an investor takes a long position in ‘losing’ stocks and short positions in ‘winning’ 
stocks, i.e. buying weakness. A momentum strategy implies that an investor takes a positions predicting a price 
continuation in the security, i.e. buying strength (Simon & Wiggins, 2001). 
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Conrad and Kaul (1998)). The purpose of this thesis is to combine previous 
research on price inefficiencies with the most prominent way of measuring implied 
volatility in order to evaluate a broader index-based short term strategy, acting 
conversely relative to the general sentiment of other investors. That is, we 
evaluate the performance of a contrarian strategy which aims to exploit any short 
term market anomalies with the use of the implied volatility as an indicator. The 
most known implied volatility index is the VIX, also referred to as the ‘Fear 
index’, which measures the markets´ general sentiment of the 30 day future 
volatility. The implied volatility index in the German stock market, which we use 
in our contrarian strategy, is called VDAX. The contrarian strategy is then 
compared to a buy and hold strategy in the German stock index DAX for the 
period 1992-2012.2 The main reason for investigating the German stock market is 
the lack of research on VDAX relative to the VIX. The German stock market 
deviates from the U.S. stock market in that it is less liquid with a lower number 
of investors holding big shares and banks being the main source for external 
capital (Achleitner, Christian, Betzer, & Weir, 2008). The concentration of 
ownership could affect the outcome of a contrarian strategy since large 
shareholders´ risk aversion is given a too heavy weight. However, we have not 
found evidence that this will affect our strategy significantly and therefore 
conclude that our strategy should work roughly the same on the German stock 
market as compared to the implementation on the U.S. market as in accordance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The DAX consists of Germany’s 30 biggest companies based partly on their market to book value and represents around 
80 percent of the German stock market capitalization. It consists solely of ‘Blue chip companies’ which are companies that 
are considered reliable in the long term regardless of the state of the market. 
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with Schireck, De Bondt and Weber (1999). 
 
 The results show that our contrarian strategy performs better in the 
aftermath of a bearish period as well as when we increase the trading. However, 
we do not outperform the buy and hold strategy, indicating that the weak form of 
the efficient market hypothesis holds.  
 
 The paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2, we describe relevant 
theory for understanding the implications of and the dominating arguments 
against a contrarian strategy. Theory from the behavioral school of economics will 
be presented together with examples of the most important biases as well as the 
systematic over and underreaction phenomenons that those might cause. These 
so-called price continuation and reversal effects are further examined in the 
following section on contrarian and momentum strategies. Also, a detailed 
description of the VDAX will be provided in order to illuminate this relatively 
new tool which we use to get information about the notion of the overall market. 
In Section 3, we describe the method and the restrictions that we have applied to 
our strategy. In Section 4 we present the results and in Section 5 we give a brief 
conclusion on the paper as well as directions for further research that we see 
appropriate. 
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2. Theory 
2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was first introduced by Fama (1970) 
and it was widely acknowledged for the applicability that it presented. The 
hypothesis states that all relevant information is directly reflected in the price of 
assets and therefore it is not possible to outperform the market portfolio. The 
hypothesis assumes that (1) all investors are rational, well informed and prefer 
more to less; (2) information is available and free for everybody; and (3) there are 
no taxes or transaction fees. The EMH is also based on the assumption that the 
price follows a random walk. The implications of a random walk is that since the 
price of a stock instantly changes in response to information, which is irregular 
and random, so is the movement in price (Malkiel, 2003). Thereby, the EMH 
states that there are no arbitrage opportunities since the price in the market 
always reflects a stocks´ fundamental price (Statman, 2008). 
 
 The efficiency of the market can generally be divided into three levels; weak 
form efficiency, semi-strong form efficiency and strong form efficiency. Weak form 
efficiency implies that it is not possible to predict future price movements by 
observing historical data, i.e. with the use of technical analysis or time series 
analysis. Thus, the accuracy of this form of market efficiency is relevant for the 
usability of our active trading strategy. With this type of market efficiency it is 
possible for investors to achieve excess return in the short run with the use of 
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fundamental analysis. Semi-strong form efficiency implies that all publicly traded 
information is reflected in the stock price and therefore neither technical nor 
fundamental analysis is of any use. Insiders may still be able to make an excess 
return based on exclusive information. Finally, strong form efficiency implies that 
all information is reflected in the market price and not even insider information is 
of use for determining future price movements (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2011). 
 
 The EMH has been criticized for the limitations regarding its assumption 
about rational investors. By implication it states that market bubbles should not 
occur in an efficient market where the price of a stock will always be the same as 
its fundamental value. However, Malkiel (2003), a intercessor of the efficient 
market hypothesis, acknowledge that irrationalities can occur as with the IT-
bubble in the late 1990’s, where external factors were not enough to explain the 
extreme price movements observed in the market. Other academics, such as De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) also give support to the fact that investors are not 
always rational, but that they in many instances can be overly optimistic or 
overly pessimistic, which is an important assumption in the area of behavioral 
finance. 
 
2.2 Behavioral Finance 
 While conventional economic theories like the EMH presume that investors 
are fully rational, behavioral finance starts with the assumption that they might 
not be. Behavioral finance is concerned with how market participants make 
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systematic errors as a result of an increase in the amount of irrational investors, 
so called noise traders. This would have a perverting effect of the stock prices of 
which market economies rely on to allocate resources efficiently. Even though the 
area of behavioral finance influenced John Maynard Keynes (among others) as 
early as in the 1920’s the theory still remains relatively unexplored today 
(Gervais, 2010). In addition, models aiming to take the behavioral aspect into 
account, such as the Behavioral Asset Pricing Model, have not penetrated the 
praxis of the industry (Statman, 2008). 
 
2.2.1 Limitations of Arbitrage 
 Two implications of the EMH are that security prices accurately reflect all 
available information and that active strategies will therefore fail to outperform 
the buy-and-hold strategy of the market index. Even if this does not hold and 
behavioral economist are right in that security prices are misleading, it can still 
be difficult to exploit the anomalies. These difficulties are by the behavioral 
school referred to as limitations of arbitrage. In other words, although an 
arbitrage opportunity may exist, this is not in itself a guarantee for making a risk 
free excess return. Two examples of limitations of arbitrage are noise trader risk 
and implementation costs. Noise trader risk implies that a mispricing that is 
being exploited by an arbitrageur worsens in the short run due to irrational 
investors further widening the gap between the price and the intrinsic value. In a 
situation like this an arbitrageur risks being forced to liquidate his positions 
prematurely, and thereby recieve a negative return (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 
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Implementation costs refer to the costs of taking a short position, i.e. transaction 
costs such as commissions, borrowing rates for short sales and bid-ask-spreads.  
  
 Virtually everyone agrees that if prices are the same as the intrinsic value 
there are no easy profit opportunities. But the reverse does not have to be true 
because of these limits of arbitrage. And the existence of irrational investors does 
not necessarily make a market irrational because arbitragers are expected to act 
on these anomalies until the price has adjusted so that it corresponds to its 
intrinsic value (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2011). These examples of limitations of 
arbitrage imply that even if there are mispricings in securities, an arbitrageur may 
not be able to exploit these efficiently because of the risk and cost that comes 
with taking a position. These factors could thereby leave the gap between 
intrinsic value and price unaffected. This means that even if a momentum or 
contrarian effect exist in the market, the potential profits of exploiting these 
might not be enough to motivate traders to take action since the costs and risks 
might exceed the upside of the potential trade (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
 
2.2.2. Biases 
 Psychology composes a major part of behavioral economics, offering 
explanations on systematic irrationalities that the adherents of the behavioral 
school argue contradict the EMH. These systematic irrationalities, or biases, can 
be divided into two categories: the first is that investors fail to process 
information correctly and the second is that given a probability distribution of 
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returns, investors often make systematically suboptimal decisions. One of the 
more important examples in the first category is representativeness. It occurs 
because people tend to neglect the importance of sample size and behave as if a 
small sample was as representative of a population as a large one. It could result 
in a premature recognition of sample patterns which are not observed in the 
population as a whole and thereby causes systematic overreactions in the financial 
markets (Chopra, Lakonishok & Ritter, 1992). An example with an exact opposite 
effect to the representativeness bias, i.e. which causes systematic underreaction, is 
the conservatism bias, which describes when there is a delay in investors’ response 
to new evidence. A correction of the price then follows the underreaction in order 
to reflect the new information now available, resulting in a price continuation 
(Ritter, 2003). 
 
 The field of behavioral finance assumes that even if biases concerning 
information processing did not exist, investors´ decisions would still not 
necessarily be rational. This is because of the existence of behavioral biases. 
Behavioralists argue that behavioral biases have a substantial effect in situations 
where people make judgements about the risk-return relationship in decision 
making.3 If these biases exist one should be able to make an excess return using a 
contrarian or momentum strategy, provided that you have an effective strategy 
for exploiting the over and underreactions (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2011). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Like our examples show, different biases have contrary systematic effects, making overreaction as well as underreaction 
explainable by a wide variety of different biases. This has caused the behavioral school to receive critique for essentially 
letting any fact to be explained ex post by an arbitrary psychological phenomenon (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
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2.3 Contrarian and Momentum Strategies 
 Contrarian and momentum effects in stock prices are closely related to the 
field of behavioral finance since they result from systematic inefficiencies caused 
by market players not acting completely rational. If a stock price deviates from 
its fundamental value and an investor has a good strategy for exploiting this, the 
theory states that the investor could make an excess return in comparison to the 
index (Statman 2008). For example, if there is not even weak form market 
efficiency and over and underreactions can be observed, it would be possible for 
investors to profit from price continuations and reversal effects, i.e. with technical 
analysis. 
 
 There are many different studies of the weak form of market efficiency and 
whether traders could make money from finding trends in past prices or not (see, 
for example, Jagadeesh & Titman (1999) and Simon & Wiggins, (2001)). One way 
to distinguish trends in stock prices is to measure the serial correlation, that is to 
say how stock returns correlate to past returns. Positive serial correlation occurs 
when positive returns follow positive returns, i.e. a momentum type effect. 
Negative serial correlation is when negative returns are followed by positive 
returns and vice versa, i.e. a correction type effect (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2011). 
De Bondt and Thaler (1984) discovered weak forms of market inefficiencies where 
investors overreact to unexpected events and news. They found that prior ‘loser’ 
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portfolios tended to do better than prior ‘winner’ portfolios.4 
 
 Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue that both momentum and contrarian 
strategies are equally likely to be successful but that these diametrically opposed 
strategies work simultaneously for different time horizons. The momentum 
strategy showed to be most profitable at medium horizons of 3-12 months. The 
contrarian strategy was profitable during both a short term weekly or monthly 
investing horizon and a long term period of three to five years, but only during 
the sub period between 1926-1947. This result is consistent with Fama and 
French’s (1988) research where they argue that a slowly mean-reverting 
component of stock prices tends to induce negative autocorrelation in returns over 
a three to five year horizon. In addition, Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) concluded 
that over a holding period of 3-12 months, buying stocks which have performed 
well and selling stocks that have performed poorly (thus adopting a momentum 
strategy) makes profits that are not due to additional systematic risk. 
 
2.4 VDAX 
 Volatility is an important concept in finance and is central in areas such as 
portfolio selection, asset pricing and management of risk. Projection of future 
volatility can be evaluated through analyzing historical returns or with the use of 
a tool that measures the markets´ expectation of the future volatility. In 1993 the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Three years after the portfolios were created the ‘loser’ portfolio earned about 25% more than the ‘winner’ portfolio even 
though it carried significantly less risk. Effects were observed five years after the creation of the portfolio and the results 
indicated that the effects were not attributed to changes in risk. 
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Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduced the VIX, an index 
measuring the implied volatility as a weighted average of some near the money 
S&P100 options with the use of the Black & Scholes formula (BS) (1973). In 2003 
the CBOE started using a new way of calculating the VIX  which does not 
require using the BS formula and switched the benchmark index from  the 
S&P100 with the S&P500. The German equivalent VDAX-New is calculated in 
the same way as the new VIX but with the DAX as the underlying index. VDAX-
New (hereafter referred to as VDAX) was introduced in 2003 and has been 
backward projected to 2 January 1992 (Frankfurt stock exchange, n.d.). One 
advantage of the new way of calculating the implied volatility is that you can use 
both near the money and out of the money options, making the estimate more 
robust than when using only near the money options (Rhoades, 2011). 5  The 
VDAX expresses the expected future volatility of option contracts on the DAX 
index over a 30-day period (Frankfurt stock exchange, n.d.). 
 
 Implied volatility indexes are often referred to as ’fear indexes’ because when 
there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the future development of the 
market and investors are in fear, the implied volatility will rise. The reason for 
this is that when markets are dominated by uncertainty the demand for puts will 
increase as investors seek to hedge their portfolios, which will be followed by a 
raise in their price. In accordance with the put-call parity, an increase in the price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For specifics on how to calculate VDAX-New visit <http://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/en/glossary/v/vdax+new+1091> 
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of a put leads to an increase in the price of a call on the same stock.6, 7 By 
implication this states that a net increase in the sales of options leads to a higher 
implied volatility in the market (Rhoads, 2011). 
 
 VDAX is generally acknowledged for having a strong negative correlation 
with DAX, and is therefore by many, for example Simon & Wiggins (2001), 
considered a good tool for managing portfolio risk. This means that when the 
market portfolio falls, VDAX will rise and vice versa. When using a contrarian 
strategy one should, in appliance with behavioral finance, go long when VDAX is 
considered high and the market may be overly pessimistic, and go short when 
VDAX is considered low and the market is overly confident (Rhoades, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The put-call parity defines the relationship between a European put option, p, and a European call option, c, with the 
same strike price, K, and time to maturity,T, that must exist for there to be no arbitrage opportunities. p + S = c + ke-rT 
were S defines the strike price, kerT defines the discounted value of the excersie price of the option 
7 An increase in the implied volatility can also stem from a rise in demand of calls as a substitute to long positions 
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 Figure 1 shows the fluctuations in the VDAX and DAX indexes from 1992 
to 2012. 
 
Figure 1. VDAX and DAX 1992-2012
 
 
 The left axis describes the basis points of the DAX and the right axis 
describes the VDAX expressed in percent of DAX. As you can see, the indexes 
appear to be negatively correlated with some exceptions in 1992-1994, 1996-1998 
and 2006-2008.  
 
 Table 1 describes the statistical properties of the VDAX and DAX for our 
sample period 1992-2012. 
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         Table 1. Statistical Properties of VDAX and DAX for the sample period 1992 – 2012 
 Mean Median Min Max St. dev Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
VDAX 23,56 21,19 9,35 83,23 10,01 100,23 1,576 3,033 
DAX 4620,98 4836.90 1420,30 8105,69 1861.69 3465709 -0,108 -1,185 
 
 The VDAX has a mean value of 23,56% with a standard deviation of 
approximately 10% as well as a positive skewness of 1,576. The fact that the 
VDAX exhibits a kurtosis larger than three implies that the likelihood for 
extreme values is higher than if the index would have followed a normal 
distribution (Gujarati, 2006). The Dax has an average negative kurtosis, 
indicating that it has a flatter distribution as compared to the normal distribution 
(DeCarlo, 1997). The maximum value of VDAX (83,23%) occurs during the 
subprime crisis in 2009 and is almost 6 standard deviations away from the mean 
value in our data.  
 
3. Method 
 We investigate a 20 year consecutive time period of daily data reaching from 
1992 to 2012. We collect our data of VDAX and DAX  from the market leading 
database Thomas Reuters Datastream. A comparison will be made between the 
active contrarian strategy based on sentiment indicators from VDAX and a 
benchmark buy and hold strategy. In the buy and hold strategy we take a 
position in the DAX and hold this position throughout a 30 day investment 
horizon. In the contrarian strategy we calculate our trigger points with the use of 
one, two and three deciles, extending the method used by Cacia and Tzetkov 
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(2008), who only tested a two decile strategy. For example, in the first decile 
strategy we go long when the VDAX reaches over the 9th decile and we go short 
when the VDAX goes below the 1st decile. We calculate the trigger points on a 
daily basis based on the previous 30 day period for every decile strategy during 
our 20 year sample period. By doing this we take into consideration the 
appropriate amount of information that an investor could have had at the time 
for the decision and also to account for changing market conditions.  
 
 Our strategy implies taking both long and short positions in the DAX with 
the purpose to making money regardless of the market conditions. For example, if 
we are holding a long (short) position for 30 days and the VDAX is higher (lower) 
than the top (bottom) decile, on day 31, we renew the position for another 30 
days. If the VDAX is between the decile trigger points, we close the position until 
VDAX exceeds a decile limit again. All signals are registered at the market 
closing price and a position is taken the following day at the market open price. 
To make sure that we do not implement several positions based on the same news 
and events we take only one short and/or one long position at a time during a 30 
day window. After the 30 day period we either close or renew our previous 
position depending on the value of VDAX and the relevant trigger points at the 
time. We receive an average annual interest rate of 3,5% when we go short as well 
as on days when we do not take a position, and we simplify our analysis by 
assuming that there are zero transaction costs and no taxes.8 Furthermore, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  We collected the information regarding the German interest rate from the Deutsche Bundesbank web page 
(www.bundesbank.de)	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assume that we start out with an initial amount of one euro.  
 
 The daily return of a strategy is calculated as 
 !! =   HPR!,! +   HPR!,! +   !!, 
 
were rt is the daily interest rate that we receive for going short and HPRt, L 
(HPRt, S) is the daily holding period return from a long (short) position, calculated 
as !"#!,! =   !"#!!!"#!!!!"#!!!   , 
 !"#!,!   =   !"#!!!!  !"#!!"#!!!   . 
 
 We also calculate the Sharpe ratio, which is a measurement of the return of 
per unit of risk, calculated as 
 !ℎ!"#$  !"#$%   = !"#$%&    –!!!  !"#$  !"##  !"#$%$&#  !"#$!"#$%#&%  !"#$%&$'(  . 
 
4. Results 
 Table 2 shows the average return, standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio 
for the contrarian strategy (calculated with the second decile strategy) and the 
buy and hold strategy over two-year intervals. We chose the second decile 
strategy for comparison based on the research done by Cacia and Tzetkov (2008). 
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Table 2. Periodic measurements of the strategy  
 Contrarian strategy Buy and hold strategy 
 
Average return Standard deviation Sharpe ratio Average return Standard deviation Sharpe ratio 
02/1992 - 02/1994 -13,69% 11,67% -1,50 11,59% 14,35% 0,54 
02/1994 - 02/1996 -5,85% 12,14% -0,79 6,85% 14,63% 0,21 
02/1996 - 02/1998 -0,03% 13,72% -0,28 33,69% 19,34% 1,55 
02/1998 - 02/2000 -12,57% 20,85% -0,79 -13,12% 20,83% -0,81 
02/2000 - 02/2002 -18,83% 25,65% -0,88 -20,07% 25,66% -0,93 
02/2002 - 02/2004 -3,35% 35,25% -0,20 -2,15% 35,23% -0,17 
02/2004 - 02/2006 2,54% 10,21% -0,12 19,56% 14,05% 1,12 
02/2006 - 02/2008 8,77% 17,04% 0,29 9,29% 17,07% 0,32 
02/2008 - 02/2010 -13,47% 22,71% -0,76 -4,84% 32,27% -0,27 
02/2010 - 02/2012 12,60% 23,78% 0,37 13,27% 12,75% 0,74 
Note: We are comparing the buy and hold strategy to the second decile contrarian strategy 
  
 The table shows that our active strategy tends to have a lower volatility 
than the benchmark strategy. We believe this originates from our strategy’s 
restrictions of a maximum holding of one long and/or one short position at a 
time. This will at times create fully hedged zero net positions and these situations 
will be equivalent to being outside the market, receiving interest only on the bank 
cash balance. Thus, this has a suppressing effect on the active strategy’s overall 
volatility. The buy and hold strategy exhibits a higher Sharpe ratio than the 
contrarian strategy for every period with the exception of 1998-2002. We believe 
that this too is a result of the net zero position effect because scenarios where an 
investor is positioned as if being inactive will benefit him in declining markets 
relative to a long position in the index. Consequently, we argue that the slightly 
higher Sharpe ratios for the active strategy is not because of our strategy’s 
superiority in bear markets but that it could rather be explained as a 
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phenomenon of the inactivity that seems to be inherent in the way the 
restrictions were created.  
 
 The contrarian strategy generates a negative return in every period except 
for the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2012. Both of these periods are subsequent to 
economic crisis - the World Trade Center crisis in 2001 and the subprime crisis in 
2008 - so we receive a higher return in the aftermath of negative market shocks. 
These findings indicate that the market timing signal from the VDAX works 
better during these periods. During the crisis we also observe, in accordance with 
the results of Cacia and Tzvetkov’s (2008), a highly negative correlation.  
 
 Table 3 shows the correlation over two year periods for VDAX and DAX. 
 
           Table 3. Correlation VDAX and DAX 
Period    Correlation  
02/1992 - 02/1994 0,140 
02/1994 - 02/1996 -0,480 
02/1996 - 02/1998 0,849 
02/1998 - 02/2000 -0,352 
02/2000 - 02/2002 -0,667 
02/2002 - 02/2004 -0,635 
02/2004 - 02/2006 -0,505 
02/2006 - 02/2008 0,165 
02/2008 - 02/2010 -0,725 
02/2010 - 02/2012 -0,734 
    Note: Correlation for the second decile strategy 
 
  The VDAX is often referred to as being a good hedging tool because of its 
negative correlation with the stock index. Table 3 shows that the VDAX has a 
positive correlation with the DAX during 1992-1994, 1996-1998 and 2006-2008. 
However, this is not particularly surprising since a raise in both asset prices and 
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the nervousness of the market can be observed during shorter periods (Rhoades, 
2011). What is interesting is that the correlation over the entire 20 year period 
exhibits a positive correlation of approximately 0,13. The remarkably high 
positive correlation in the period 1996-1998 could be due to the Asian crisis 
during which the German stock market was very turbulent (Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 2001). The three periods of positive correlation all have in common 
that the DAX is on average rising during them. Furthermore, we observe that all 
of these intervals of rising markets are subsequent to an already occurring bullish 
trend or to a period that is relatively stable.  
 
  Table 4 displays some properties for the performance of the different 
strategies, the number of positions we take and how many of them that return 
positive results. Also, it shows the percentage of the number of positions that 
generated a positive return. 
 
Table 4. Strategy performance 1992-2012 
Strategy                        Contrarian Buy and hold 
 
      Decile 1      Decile 2 Decile 3 
 
Performance*     
Average return -10,84% -13,14% -14,45% 9,40% 
Risk** 19,11% 18,25% 16,78% 23,25% 
Sharpe ratio -0,23 -0,85 -1,01 0,30 
 
Positions     
Number of positions        211 239 262 - 
- Long wins 54/94 (57%) 67/113 (59%) 51/123 (41%) - 
- Short wins 40/117 (34%) 89/126 (71%) 48/139 (35%) - 
Total wins 94/211 (45%) 156/239 (65%) 99/262 (38%) - 
 Note: *Average annualized performance  
       **Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the strategies 
  
 The table reveals that our strategy performs worse the more active the 
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trading gets. This is consistent with the fundamental theories in the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) & Lintner (1965) and the EMH which 
argue that a passive holding of the market portfolio is the optimal decision. If 
there are any systematic errors in pricing as described by behavioral finance and 
previous research on contrarian trading strategies, our strategies fail to exploit 
these. The Sharpe ratios are also consistent with the CAPM theory that the buy 
and hold strategy is superior to all of our active strategies. The trading strategy 
using the top and bottom 2 deciles as trigger points shows a fairly good trait as it 
receives a positive return in 65,27% of the total positions taken. This does not 
make it profitable since the losing trades, even though they are fewer in numbers, 
heavily outweigh the profits from the winners. Table 4 shows that an increase in 
trading activity lowers the risk. This might seem counter intuitive, but we believe 
this fact originates from the same strategy restrictions of maximum one long and 
short position at the time (as we mentioned earlier in the commentary of Table 
2). An easier triggered strategy takes more positions and consequently creates 
more zero net positions that lower the risk of the overall strategy. Lower deciles 
also open more single long and short positions as well. Thus, the dampening effect 
on volatility of the net zero positions outweigh the diametrically opposed effect of 
increased volatility caused by additional single long and short positions. This may 
suggest that we trade too actively for the type of restriction presented in this 
paper. 
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 Table 5 describes the average annualized return for the whole sample period 
(1992-2012) for the long and short positions independently within each strategy. 
 
      Table 5. Average annualized return in the contrarian strategy 
 Long position Short position 
Decile 1 0,01% -15,76% 
Decile 2 -1,78% -17,06% 
Decile 3 -2,08% -16,75% 
 
 Interestingly, Table 5 shows that the short positions performs substantially 
worse than the long positions. Since our short strategy is based on taking short 
positions when the market is considered overly confident it indicates that these 
trigger points provided by the VDAX are not as strong signals as when the 
market is in fear. We reason that this might stem from the fact that fear leads to 
quicker responses in the market than a state of market calmness, which is built 
up more gradually. 
 
5. Conclusion and Directions for Further Research 
 In order to investigate whether or not our short term contrarian strategy is 
profitable we backtested and analyzed a strategy where we went long or short in 
the DAX as an opposite reaction of the general market sentiment provided by the 
VDAX. The German marketplace was chosen because of the lack of research on 
VDAX trading strategies relative to studies made on VIX. VDAX itself was 
chosen for its alleged ability to reflect the markets collective sentiment of the 
implied volatility in the near future. 
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 We conclude that we are not able to make an excess return based on 
sentiment indicators from the VDAX. We discovered that the VDAX has 
historically not been as strong and consistently negative correlated with the DAX 
as we had thought. Since our contrarian strategy was based partly on this 
presumption we feel it might have been a contributing factor to the negative 
results. However, during the periods where we observed a highly negative 
correlation we still failed to generate a positive return, implying that the findings 
of positive correlation can not single-handedly explain the failure of the strategy. 
We also discovered that our strategy performed best during bearish periods.  
 
 We feel that a good direction for further research would be to test our 
strategy using smaller percentiles and thereby limit our trading since we found 
that this gave better results. The strategy could also be altered in regards to the 
restriction of how many positions you may take during a time window, since our 
strategy unwittingly held a substantial amount of net zero positions leaving us 
outside the market in many instances. Also, the time window could be shortened 
since market conditions can change a lot during a 30 day period. 
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